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LAKE SUPERIOR IRoN CO. v. ERICKSON.
force of the enactment rests upon the
later statute. Although the former act
remains upon the statute-book and is
not repealed, either expressly or by implication, it is no longer regarded as the
law of the land in respect to new cases
that may arise. The earlier act is
merged in the amendatory act, and a
repeal of the amendatory act does not
revive the original act, but both fall
together: People v. Supervisors of 3fontgormery County, 67 N. Y. 109. See also
Goodno v. Oskkosh, 31 Wis. 127 ; Kerlinger v. Barnes, 14 Minn. 528; Burwell v. Tullis, 12 Id. 575 ; Ely v. Holton,

15 N. Y. 595. If, however, it appears
that the legislature did not intend
merely to repeat or copy the language
of the original law, but, although using
the same words, intended them to have
a different meaning and effect, this rule
is not applicable : Kerlinger v. Barnes,
supra. Where, however, a subsequent
act, providing that a certain section of a
prior act shall thereafter read in a certain way, re-enacts some of its provisions, but omits others, it is a repeal
of such omitted provisions: The state
v. Andrews, 20 Tem. 230; sate v. Ingersoll, 17 Wis. 631 ; Goodno v. OshkosA, 31 Id. 127 ; Pingree v. Snell, 42
Me. b5. The court, in The State v. Andrews, though it was not necessary to
the decision of the cause, also laid down
the rule, that the entire section thus reenacted, in the subsequent statute was
thereby repealed. See, however, the
cases already cited contra.

So, in Ellis v. Paige, I Pick. 45, it
is said to be a well-settled rule that
when any statute is revised, or one act
framed from another, some parts being
omitted, the parts omitted are not to be
revived by construction, but are to be
considered as annulled. See also Blackburn v. Walpole, 9 Pick. 104; Pingree
v. Snell, supra.
But the doctrine that a statute is impliedly repealed by a subsequent statute
revising the whole subject-matter of the
first, is not applicable where the revising statute declares what effect it is intended to have on the former, as where
it provides that such provisions of the
earlier as are inconsistent with the later
are repealed. In such case only such
effect can be given to the revising act as
it directs, ana only the inconsistent provisions of the earlier act are repealed:
Pattersonv. Tatum, 3 Sawyer 164. See
also MLcRae v. Wessd, 6 Ired. Law
153. So, where a chapter of a revision
of general statutes repealed all acts and
parts of acts thq subjects of which were
revived and re-enacted in the revision,
or which were repugnant to its provisions, it was held that this must be con
strued. as referring to general- statutes.
and not as repealing all provisions
of village and city charters, previously
enacted, which were in conflict with the
general statutes contained in said revision: Walwortll County v. Village of
Whitewater, 17 Wis. 193; City of
Janesville v. Markoe, 18 Id. 350.
M. D. EWELL.

Supreme Court of Micligan.
LAKE SUPERIOR IRON CO. v. CATHARINE ERICKSON.
Where a mining company let a contract for taking ofit a certain quantity of ore,
but employed persons of supposed skill to watch for dangers from loosened rocks,
and in other ways retained a control over the mode of mining, and a servant of
the contractors was killed by the falling of a rock, the danger from which ought
to have been detected and guarded against: Held, that the mining company was
responsible.
The question of- negligence is generally one of fact, not of l-w.
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It is not contributory negligence for a servant to go into a dangerous place in
deference to th. opinions of others who are supposed to have, and by their positions
are bound to have, special knowledge which should enable them to judge of the
dangers more accurately than the servant himself.
THE defendant in error recovered a judgment, in the court below,
as administratrix of her deceased husband, Andrew Erickson, who
was killed by a falling rock, while engaged in working in the mine
of the plaintiff in error, July 9th 1877.
It appeared that Erickson had been employed, the day before his
death, as one of a mining gang, under the management chiefly of
Gustav Stenson, who, with his partners, had taken a contract for
mining and hoisting ore, at ninety-five cents per ton for ore, and
twenty-five cents per ton for rock. This contract having been made
July 1st 1877, for a month, and similar contracts having been made
in previous months, from the beginning of April. Erickson was
employed by the day, at $1.50 per day. The pay arrangement
was, that the company officers were to puy the men on the certificates of the contractors, deducting this pay from the final settlements.
These contracts were all let by Day and McEncroe, as officers
of the company, who had general charge, for the company, of the
affairs in the mine.
The pit where these contractors were at work had been carried
along the lode so as to leave the upper or hanging wall, which was
at an angle of sixty-five degrees, exposed from twenty to twentyfive feet high, and not far from the same distance along the level,
with no support or timbering of the hanging wall in that space.
Erickson was engaged in sinking a winze or ventilating shaft from
this level, and had sunk it about two feet and eight inches when
killed. The rock which killed him fell from about half way up the
hanging wall, and was just over the winze.
The chief controversy related to the question whether this rock
was previously in a condition which made it so apparently dangerous
as to require removal or timbering; and, if so, on whom, if any
one, was the risk and responsibility?

The opinion of the court was delivered by
CAmPBELL, J.-Upon a careful inspection of the record we do not
think any questions become material except those which bear on the
rights and duties of the various parties in connection with the mine.
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The other errors assigned do not appear to be founded on sufficient
showing in the record. The only one urged by counsel was the
rejection of a question put on cross-examination to Stenson, asking
him whether it was not his business, and that of his associates, to
be on the lookout and watch for dangerous places. We think that,
when the terms and conditions of his contract were shown, this was
rather a deduction than a fact, and he could not properly be allowed
or required to answer it. He was not precluded from explaining
fully the mutual understanding of the contracting parties as to
what the contract was, or as to usage.
It was claimed on the argument and this claim is based on the
assignments of error, that on the whole case there was no ground
of recovery. And as reasons for this position several legal propositions are advanced, which are chiefly as follows: that there could
be no recovery if Erickson was in the employ of Stenson as a day
laborer; or if he was not under control of the company or its officers,
and if Stenson and his associates were to mine and do their work
properly; or if he was willing to work after such examination as
was shown. And it was claimed in various forms that Erickson
undertook all the risks that were established. It will be more convenient to refer to the points raised in the wayadopted by counsel,
than to pursue every sub-division separately.
There was evidence that the rock in question had been considered
as dangerous some time before the contract of July, and that the
attention of Day and McEncroe had been called to it. There was
evidence of various attempts, by sounding it with an iron bar, to
ascertain its safety. There was conflicting evidence as to some of
the declarations of the mining officers on this subject. There was
evidence on one side that they expressed themselves decidedly on
its safety. There was also evidence to go to the jury that they
retained the right to determine what large rocks should be removed
and what timbering or propping should be done. There was also
testimony of the increase of water oozing from the seams, claimed
to indicate a gradual loosening. The theory of plaintiff in error
.was that the rock had been started by blasts from the winze, and
that sufficient care had not been taken to examine it thereafter.
It fell about two hours after a blast. Other matters of fact will be
referred to in their place.
It is proper first to consider the respective positions of the parties.
Day and McEncroe stood in the place of the mining company in
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making these contracts. There was no employment relation between
them and Erickson, who was laboring under the contractors. So
far as this changed the relative liabilities of the parties it must
operate in this case. But while there are cases in which there is
no legal duty or privity between principals and the servants of
those who contract with them, this lack of privity is not universal
and absolute. If, for example, a railroad company were to contract"
with a firm of car-builders to build cars according to given plans in
places under the entire control of the builders, there could be no
possible corporate responsibility for injuries received- by workmen
in their callings. But on the other hand it might be quite possible
for men to be employed in piece work in the shops of such companies
where they retained more or less control, when for the failure of a
corporate duty the workmen or strangers injured by that failure
might have a cause of action for the wrong directly against the
corporation, although it had not employed them. The case of the
M-ty of Detroit v. Corey, 9 Mich. 165, is a case where the corporation was held liable for neglect of a contractor in not properly
guarding against danger from an excavation in a public street.
The same principle was applied in Darmstetter v. Moynahan, 27
Mich. 188 ; Me Wiliams v. Detroit CentralMz7ls Co., 31 Id. 274 ;
Gardnerv. Smith, 7 Id. 410; Bay City & -E. Sag. Railroad Co.
v. Austin, 21 Id. 390; Continental Imp. Co. v. Ives, 30 Id. 448;
G. R. & Rd. Railroad Co. v. Southwick, 30 Id. 444.
No doubt the range of the owner's responsibility is very much
less in most cases where contractors are employed and have their
own servants at work than where the servants are employed by the
proprietors. The main question in such cases is whether any duty
remained which sprang from the proprietor's own position, and from
the violation of which the damage arose. In the present case there
are two principal inquiries, which are (1) whether the death of
Erickson was due to the fault of the mining company in not doing
what they were bound to do for the protection of those working in
their mines: and (2) whether Erickson himself was responsible for
running the risk vhich proved fatal. Of course both of these
questions are aside from the third question, whether the death was
accidental, and not due to the fault of any one.
The court below told the jury that there could be no recovery in
this case if the duty was on Stenson and his associates to guard
against such risks, and that the same was true if Erickson contrib-

LAKE SUPERIOR IRON CO. v. ERICKSON.

uted to the injury by his own want of care. They were also told
that there was no ground of recovery if the falling of the rock was
not under circumstances which showed that the company had been
guilty of such negligence as showed such want of care and caution
as prudent persons would not be guilty of. They were particularly
directed that unless the conduct of Day and McEncroe was thus
negligent and the cause of the mischief, there could be no recovery,
and that the company would be liable for their neglect or misconduct and not for that of any one else appearing in the case.
We think the court was correct in holding that Day and McEncroe represented the company for this purpose. They appear to
have had entire control of all the business that is involved in the
record, and we think there is no room to question the propriety of
these rulings if they were applicable, and not neutralized by other
instructions. In this connection it is proper to notice one of the
special assignments of error which is calculated to give a wrong
impression. The court is represented as telling the jury to inquire
whether the company used such care and precautions as "relieved
them from liability in this suit," and it is claimed this left a question of law to the jury. But the next sentence of the charge
explained what would or would not make them liable. Isolated
sentences cannot be allowed to be considered apart from their context. The instructions were not so separated as to create confusion, but were really but a single and correct ruling.
We think that unless the case was one too plain to go to the jury
on that point, it was properly left to them to say whether the accident occurred without any one's fault or neglect. It is not for us
to draw inferences of fact in such cases. There was certainly
evidence to go to the jury indicating that there should have been
measures taken by some one to either remove or prop the rock that
fell.
We think also that there was properly before them a question
whether Erickson himself was guilty of contributory negligence.
A great deal of testimony was introduced to show that there was
no apparent danger which could be discovered, and that the company was justified in treating the rock as -safe. There was also
much testimony to the contrary. The place was one not easily
examined by the ordinary mining lights. If there was no apparent danger it was not recklessness to work under this rock. 'If, on
the other hand, there was real danger, and Erickson was informed
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of it on the day he entered the mine, there was nevertheless
evidence that those about him who had practical knowledge of the
mine in which he was a stranger, acted as if they did not think so,
and the guards, usually expected against danger, were absent. The
duty of examining such places after a blast is confined by the testimony to dangerous places, and not made out clearly even there as
devolving on Erickson. The jury have necessarily found he was not
careless, and there was testimony on which they could lawfully act.
The question next arises whether the responsibility of protecting
Erickson from such a danger, if supposed to exist, rested on his
immediate employers. This was also dependent on testimony, and
involved some inquiry into their relations with the company.
Does it then appear so to bind the court and jury that the contractors in this particular service had the responsibility confined to
them of guarding their workmen from the probable dangers of their
employment? There is no dispute in this case upon the general
principle of law that a responsibility lies somewhere to prevent
workmen from being exposed without such protection as is reasonably required in a dangerous business. The law is very clear that
it is culpable negligence to avoid keeping mining works as well protected as usual prudence would dictate. And there is no doubt
that a common danger in mines is from falling rocks. The hanging wall being on an angle-in this instance of sixty-five degreeswith the level, any lack of cohesion in its parts must lead to the
fall of such part of it as is seriously loosened, and that fall must
be hastened by the concussion of the air or the blows of flying
roeks thrown against it by blasting below and near it. In the
present case the rock which fell being directly above the winze,
and only about twelve feet from its mouth, every blast in that
shaft would necessarily throw more or less rock against this sloping
roof; and this must continue until the shaft is either finished or
opened to such a depth as to deaden or destroy the upward force of
the explosions.
The fact that this rock was considered dangerous, and so reported
several weeks before the accident, and the further fact if true (and
the jury probably believed them) that there was a perceptible
iicrease in the dangerous symptoms, certainly imposed a duty of
either removing the real dangers or using such means as are generally deemed adequate to determine whether any danger existed.
The further fact that the hanging wall was composed of a species
VOL. XX=.-S
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of rock whose thickness was not found generally uniform, and which
was sometimes thin enough to possess no very great resisting power
to shocks of disintegrating agencies, was one which could not be
left out of view by any prudent calculation. A broad expanse of
some twenty-five feet square of rock, only supported by its own
cohesive power from falling, may, according to the testimony, have
weak points where it may give way unless propped, or unless the
unreliable mass is removed. There was testimony, which it is not
our province to pass upon, which indicated, if believed, that no
reliable test could be found for determining the solidity of the rock
when water was escaping through such seams as existed in this
wall.
We think there was a question fairly open whether neglect to
guard against the accident was not culpable. The jury have found
it was.
If so, the only remaining question is whether the jury had
proof before them whereby they could lawfully hold the company
to this responsibility.
Under the contracts shown by the proofs, the contractors had
nothing to do with planning the mine or selecting their working
ground, unless with very small discretionary' choice. The shafts
and levels and the winze must necessarily have been determined on
by the owners of the mine, and the mining gang worked on short
contracts. Their business, except in sinking the winze, was merely
stripping the lode of its ore, and the winze was apparently,
as it must usually be, down the lode. The pay for getting out
dead rock was but little beyond one-fourth that of getting out
ore, and work in the rock outside of the lode was not contemplated. They testified, and the jury must have believed them,
that the company reserved the power of determining when and
where dangerous rock in the wall should be removed, if requiring
removal by blasting, and of locating the supporting pillars or placing timbers to prop the wall.. Such timbering would be expensive,
and is not provided for by the contracts, which are confined to rock
and ore blasting and removal. Either the mine must be unguarded,
or else, on this state of facts, the company must guard it.
Under such circumstances it is very plain that the company,
being the owners of the dangerous property, and inviting men to
work on it, -their responsibility for its protection cannot be changed
by the fact that the work is done by the ton instead of by the day,
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or by the fact that the men who contract with them have laborers
of their own. By employing men to act for them in either way
they hold out the assurance that they can work in the mine on the
ordinary conditions of safety usually found in such places. They
guarantee nothing more than is usual among prudent owners, and
they do not insure against that which is purely accidental. But
they do tacitly represent that they have not been and will not be
reckless themselves.
If men choose with their own eyes open to run into danger they
may forfeit claims to redress. But it cannot be considered reckless
in men who are in doubt upon a matter which cannot be determined absolutely, to pay some regard to the opinions and assurances of those who are supposed to have and by their position are
bound to have special knowledge called for by their larger responsibilities. In the present case the assurances of safety given by the
mining agents cannot be disregarded, and were rightly subject to
consideration by the jury.
We think the jury were very carefully and correctly instructed
concerning their duty, and that there was testimony which warranted their verdict.
There is no error in the record, and the judgment must be
utfirmed with costs.
The importance of the point involved
in the foregoing opinion will justify inviting attention to other cases more or
less analogous. For convenience these
will be classified under appropriate
heads.
I. The owner of lands is under no
obligation to protect trespassers against
dangers iu coming upon them. If,
therefore, persons intentionally come
upon his lands without his permission
and without lawful right, and fall into
pits or encounter other dangers, he is
not responsible, even though he may
have been grossly careless in leaving
the pits uncovered or the other dangers
unguarded: Houmsell v. ,Smyth, 7 C. B.
N. S. 731 ; Stone v. Jackson, 16 C. B.
199; Hunt v. London, "4c., Railway
Co., 1 Q. B. 277; John v. Bacon, Law
Rep. 5 C. B. 437; Vanderbeck v. Henry,
34 N. J. 467; Hargreaves v. Deacon, 25

Mich. 1. This rule has been applied to
children, who were tempted to meddle
with exposed machinery, and wereinjured thereby: Mangan v. Atterton,
Law Rep. I Exch. 239 ; Wood v. School
District, 44 Iowa 27. Compare Keefe
v. Milwaukee, 4-c., Railroad Co., 21
Minn. 207. And to a servant, who
fell through a scuttle when moving
about for curiosity : Severy v. Nickerson, 120 Mass. 306.
2. But if one either expressly or by
implication invites another upon his
premises, for business or pleasure, or
other reason, he by so doing assumes
the duty to guard the other against
dangers which might be encountered in
accepting the invitation, or at least to
warn the person invited of their existence, that he may avoid them. This
point is strongly put in some cases,
where persons have been injured in ap-
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proaching the stations of railroad companies, by reason of their platforms or
other approaches being out of repair:
Smith v. London, 4-c., Railwvay Co., Law
Rep. 3 C. P. 326 ; Tobin v. Portland,
4-c., Railroad Co., 59 Me. 183; McDonald v. Chicago, 4-c., Railroad Co., 26
Iowa 124 ; Alich. Cent. Railroad Co. v.
Coleman, 28 Mich. 440 ; Chicago, 6-c.,
Railroad Co. v. Wilson, 63 Ill. 167;
Swords v. Edgar, 59 N. Y. 28. The
obligation in this regard extends to
those who come to welcome others, or
to assist others in leaving : Zoss v. Missouri, 4-c., Railroad Co., 59 Mo. 27; but
not to those who gather in a crowd to
witness a passing parade, and are injured by the giving way of the platform: Gillis v. Pennsylvania Railroad
Co., 59 Penna. St. 129. It is said in
this last case that if a traveller by foot
on the open track of a railroad crosses
a bridge which ought to be, but is not,
in its ordinary use, strong enough to
bear a locomotive and train of cars, and
a rotten board breaks down under him,
the company are not liable to him, for
they owe him no duty. See further as
to the general principle, Bush v. Steinman, 1 Bos. & P. 404; Southcote v.
Stanley, 1 H. & N. 247; Indermaur v.
Dames, Law Rep. I C. P. 274; s. c.
Law Rep. 2 C. P. 181 ; Chapman v.
Rothwell, E., B. & E. 168; Francisv.
Coc-rell, Law Rep. 5 Q. B. 184; El
liott v. Pray, 10 Allen 378; Freer v.
Cameron, 4 Rich. 228; Latham v. Roach,
72 111. 179 ; Sweeney v. Old Colony Railroad Co., 10 Allen 368; Pierce v. Whitcomb, 48 Vt. 127.
3. The duty not to expose others to
unknown dangers on one's own premises is as much a duty to servants as
to any others ; for, though by their contract of service they take upon themselves all the risks properly incident to
it, yet the negligence of the master is
not one of these, and if he sends his
servants into dangers to them unknown,
and which they'had no reason to look
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for, he will be held responsible for the
consequences: Coombs v. New Bedford
Cordage Co., 102 Mass. 572 ; Grizzle v.
Frost, 3 Fost. & F. 622 ; Bartonskill
Coal Co. v. 3McGire, 3 Macq. H. L.
300; Mfalone v. H1awley, 46 Cal. 408;
Baltimore, 6-c., Railroad Co. v. Woodward, 41 bid. 268 ; Perry v. ffarsh, 25
Ala. 659 ; Strahlendorfv. Rosenthal, 30
Wis. 674; Paulmeer v. Erie Railway,
34 N. J. 151 ; Illinois Central Railroad
Co. v. Welch, 52 Ill. 183 ; Snow v.
Housatonic Railroad Co., 8 Allen 441 ;
Lanning v. New York Central Railroad
Co, 49 N. Y. 521 ; Lousrille, 4-c., Railroad CO.v. Caven, 9 Bush 559 ; Coughty v. Globe Woollen Co., 56 N. Y. 124;
Beh v. Carter, 68 Id. 283; Deford T.
Keyser, 30 Md. 179 ; Godley v. Hagarty,
20 Penna. St. 387. The rule has been
applied to a railroad company sending
out cars upon a track blocked with snow
and ice, in consequence of which plaintiff was injured: Fifeld v. Northern
Railroad Co.. 42 N. H. 225.
4. Where one is doing work under a
contract upon the land of another, the
primary obligation to protect his laborers no doubt rests upon the contractor
rather than upon the landowner, but
this is liable to be controlled by circumstances. The obligation to give warning of all dangers not apparent, is one
he owes to the contractor as much as to
his own servants, and to those employed by the contractor to the same
extent and for the same reabons. The
duty is of course very plain where, as
in the principle case, the landowner
takes upon himself the obligation of
watchfulness, and it then corresponds to
that of a landlord who, in leasing premises, covenants to keep them in repair, and is held liable to third persons
who are injured by his failure to keep
the covenant: Bardick v. Cheadle, 26
Ohio .(N. S.) 393; Campbell v. Sugar
Co., 62 Me. 552; Owings v. Jones,
9 Md. 108 ; Grady.v. Walsner, 46 Ala.
381.
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5. How far one may be liable to those held in Laverone v. Maugianti, 41 Cal.
who are injured in coming upon his 138, that one who keeps a vicious dog,
premises under license of the law is a as a watch-dog, is liable to one who, by
question not discussed in the books. accident, is put within the dog's reach
the
Suppose, for example, that a traveller and is injured; but that was upon
the
keep
to
right
no
had
he
that
ground
in
and
impassible,
finds the highway
passing around the obstruction on pri- vicious dog at all. But doubtless a
vate grounds, as he lawfully may, he man may keep a dangerous dog upon
lawfully as any other
falls into an unguarded pit, can the his premises as
due warning to those
he
gives
if
danger,
his
for
owner of the land be held liable
injury I Or an officer enters his house who might come within his reach : see
to serve a writ, and is precipitated Sarch v. Blackburn, 4 C.. & P. 297 ;
489. But beyond
through a trap-door, can the owner be Curtis v. Mills, 5 Id.
say, he would
should
we
question,
any
made responsible as for negligence ?
The question is one of no little interest ; be liable to one who, visiting his prefor while the party injured is in the ex- mises by license of the law, should be
ercise of a legal right, it must be con- assailed by a vicious animal of any sort,
ceded that the other, as a general rule, kept by the owner with knowledge of
may leave his premises in any condition his vicious propensity : see Blackman v.
he pleases, provided he does nothing, ,Simmons, 3 C. & P. 138; Sherfey v.
expressly or by implication, to bring Bartley, 4 Sneed 58 ; Loomis v. Terry,
T. M. C.
others into danger upon them. It was 17 Wend. 496.

U. S. Oarcuit Court, -EastenDistrict of Visconsin.
B. LEIDERSDORF

ET AL.

v. J. G. FLINT.

The maker of a trade-mark is neither an author nor an inventor, and a trademark is neither a writing nor a discovery, within the meaning of the provision
of the Constitution giving to Congress jurisdiction over the subject of copyrights,
and patents.
Congress, therefore, has no jurisdiction over the subject of trade-marks, and so
much of title 60 of the Revised Statutes as relates to trade-marks is unconstitutional and void.

Iw Equity.

This was a bill for an injunction to restrain an

alleged infringement by defendant of complainants' trade-mark,
used upon packages of tobacco, and registered according to act of
Congress. Both complainants and defendant were citizens of
Wisconsin, and the bill was based upon that provision of section
4942, Revised Statutes, which gives to a party aggrieved by the
wrongful use of his trade-mark, a remedy by injunction, -according
to the course of equity, in any court having jurisdiction over the
person guilty of such wrongful use, and was filed upon the theory
that this court had jurisdiction to entertain such a bill, though both
parties are citizens of the same state.

